Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the online auction mechanism in the USA is more effective at pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) than the traditional book building process. Design/methodology/approach -The analysis compares the performance of online auction IPOs with traditional IPOs issued in the same industry area and in the same year to assess the differences in first day mispricing and its persistence. The paper compares the characteristics of firms choosing the auction process relative to the traditional process. It also uses regression models to examine whether online auction IPOs had a significantly lower first day price increase than traditional IPOs. Findings -The results indicate that for 60 percent of the auction IPOs, over 40 percent of the traditional IPOs issued in that year and in that three-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) area had greater mispricing. The mispricing of online auction IPOs relative to traditional IPOs persist over time for 50-80 percent of online auction IPOs. Regression analyses controlling for industry effects, year effects, size of the issue, and type of traditional underwriter (low, medium, and high volume underwriters) suggest that the auction's first day price surges are not significantly lower than those of traditional underwriters. Moreover, high volume traditional underwriters have statistically significantly higher first day price surges than low volume traditional underwriters, supporting the theory that they intentionally misprice to benefit their preferred clients. Firms choosing the auction process tend to be smaller in terms of the number of shares of their IPO and their annual sales than firms choosing the traditional IPO process. There is some overlap in industry sector and age, although this varies by year. Originality/value -This paper suggests that the auction process may not be as efficient in pricing IPOs as was initially intended and that there are opportunities for further innovation and improvement.
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I. Introduction and literature review
The resurgence in the initial public offering (IPO) market in 2007 in the USA and overseas raises the question of whether the traditional IPO issuance process is more or less efficient in pricing IPOs than the online auction process. Minimizing the first day price surge of IPOs has been an important topic in the USA since the dot-com era, when various dot-coms experienced substantial price growth from their initial price on the first day; examples include Enel (966.9 percent), VA Linux (896.7 percent), and Sycamore Networks (612.8 percent). In recent years, the average first day price surge for an IPO has fallen. This is partially because the exuberance and uncertainty over new technology in the dot-com boom has ended, and partially due to the initiation and conclusion of legal proceedings by the then -New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against many of the underwriting investment banks which alleged that the investment banks had manipulated IPO prices during the dot-com era to benefit their preferred clients. Despite this, mispricing has continued [1] , although on a smaller scale than was seen during the dot-com boom [2] . This paper compares the performance of the traditional IPO process in pricing new issues with the performance of the online auction process in the USA, as well as provides some possible explanations for the results.
In the traditional IPO "book building" process, the underwriting investment banks take the issue on a "road show" to various possible investors (often large mutual funds or preferred clients of the investment bank) and build a demand curve of possible prices for the IPO based upon the indications of interest that they receive from the investors in terms of the price that they are willing to pay for the IPO and the number of shares that they are willing to buy. Based on demand curve developed through this "book building" process, the underwriting investment banks determine an "offer price" for the IPO. The offer price is usually about 7 percent below the price at which the underwriters purchase the shares of the IPO from the issuing company. The underwriters then resell the shares of the IPO at the "offer price" to the institutional investors and preferred clients of the investment bank who assisted them in pricing the IPO through the "book building" process. The 7 percent spread between the price at which the underwriters buy the IPO from the issuing company and the offer price at which they resell the issue to their preferred clients represents the profits for the underwriters [3] . When the IPOs price jumps up from the offer price on the first day of trading, the investors receiving the initial allotments of the IPO benefit because they were allocated the shares at the offer price by the underwriting investment bank. This underpricing -, i.e. setting the offer price too low such that it jumps up on the first day -suggests that the IPO may not have been accurately priced and represents "money left on the table" to the issuing firm, because they sold the issue to the underwriters at 7 percent below the offer price and therefore could have obtained greater proceeds if the offer price had been higher and had more accurately reflected the value of the company. Indeed, Aggarwal et al. (2002) find a stronger positive relationship between institutional allocation and underpricing than would be predicted by the premarket demand. Consequently, developing a more accurate offer price, which will minimize mispricing, is important (the Wall Street Journal, 2005a; Ian, 2005) . Loughran and Ritter (2004) discuss some of the causes for the underpricing in the traditional IPO process during the dot-com era. They argue that executives of issuing firms were more willing to accept underpricing of shares of their firm because they were Efficiency of IPO processes allocated shares of other new IPOs, so that they could benefit from the underpricing (and the resulting first day price increase) in these IPOs -a practice known as "spinning." Loughran and Ritter (2004) also discuss the greater importance of analyst coverage during the 1990s for IPOs (relative to other time periods), which made issuing firms more likely to go to investment banks with the top analysts [4] . The development of the Dutch auction process, OpenIPO.com (which was developed by Hambrecht, who had previously co-founded the investment bank Hambrecht & Quist (the San Jose Business Journal, 1999)) was the mechanism for the issuance of Google's IPO and represents one of the most recent of the attempts to efficiently price IPOs so that the underwriter receives a more accurate reflection of the economic value of the firm. The online auction process debuted in February 1999 with the issuance of the IPO for Ravenswood Wineries. As numerous press articles have noted, the Dutch auction method would supposedly minimize or eliminate the first day price surge in IPOs [5] by developing an offer price which is a more accurate reflection of the company's value through an auction rather than through the "book building" process. Under this method, bidders post the price that they are willing to pay and the number of shares that they wish to purchase. The auction is open for about two weeks, and bidders can change or cancel their bids until the close of the auction. After the auction ends, OpenIPO.com assembles the bids in order from highest to lowest, and then sets the offer price. All bidders who bid above this price have their bids satisfied at this offer price, while those who bid below it do not have their bids satisfied. This offer price is usually the highest price at which all of the shares are sold, based on the cumulation of the bids [6] . If the number of shares in the bids above the offer price exceeds the total number of shares available in the offering, then shares are allocated on a "pro-rata" basis [7] . Unlike the traditional method, in which the individuals participating in the setting of the offer price are institutional investors and/or preferred clients of the underwriters, bidders in the auction method can include smaller investors. The role of the investment bank as the middleman is minimized. Generally, Hambrecht's usual fee ranges from 4 to 6 percent of the proceeds and is sometimes even less than that, which is lower than the 7 percent fee charged by traditional underwriters (the Wall Street Journal, 2005a) . But, is the online auction process likely to solve the problem of underpricing and of the resulting first day price surges for IPOs, or will it generate additional problems?
This analysis compares the first day mispricing of the online auction process through OpenIPO.com with that of the IPO process using traditional underwriters and examines whether the first day mispricing from the auction process persists over time. The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the data and provides summary statistics indicating differences in the first day mispricing of online auction IPO's and traditional IPO's over time, as well as compares the characteristics of IPOs debuting using each process in terms of their size, age, and industry sector. Section III presents empirical results comparing the performance of the online auction IPO process and the traditional IPO process by matching IPOs issued in the same year and in the same industry sector by the two processes, as well as by using regression models controlling for the industry sector and the size of the IPOs. Section III also examines whether the first day mispricing from the online auction process persists over time. Section IV presents some possible explanations for the lack of success of the online auction process in efficiently pricing IPOs and provides some possible solutions. Finally, Section V presents the conclusions. IJMF 5, 3 Little work has been done on the empirical performance of IPO auctions; this analysis contributes to the literature in that it empirically examines the performance of the US online auction process and compares it to the results of the traditional IPO process. Kandel et al. (1999) examine the demand schedules and elasticities of 27 Israeli IPOs between 1993 and 1996, which debuted using a uniform price auction and find underpricing and an average abnormal return on the first day of trading of 4.5 percent. Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) examine the Mise en Vente auction-like mechanism used in France using data on 92 IPOs between 1983 and 1996 and find average underpricing of about 13 percent. They also argue that the Dutch auction format can lead to tacit collusion on the part of bidders and can lead to underpricing. Several papers examine optimal mechanism design, including Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) and Jagannathan and Sherman (2005) . Sherman (2000) models how in a repeated setting, underwriters can lower the excess returns of uninformed investors and thus lower the degree of underpricing, as well as discusses how hybrid book building can lead to greater underpricing than straight book building. Carter et al. (2000) focus on the use of the internet to distribute an IPO to small investors, but not to price it (as the online auction process does). They explore the characteristics of IPOs which are underwritten by traditional underwriters, but which allocate some portion of the initial shares to an online investment bank, such as Wit Capital, which can then distribute them to small investors. Their analysis examined the characteristics and behavior of 27 IPOs debuting between July and December 1998, so both the dataset and the date of publication of the paper largely pre-dated the online IPO auction pricing process, although the paper notes that the online auction process had recently been developed. Their findings suggested that firms using the internet for distribution were larger, used more reputable underwriters, and had younger CEOs. They had greater volume and volatility than IPOs that chose the traditional distribution mechanism. They also had higher returns, which the authors suggested was due to the underwriter discounting the offer price to reflect the riskiness inherent in this new method of distributing the IPO or due to the firms having younger CEOs.
Differences in information sets for investors provide explanations for IPO underpricing in the traditional process. Rock (1986) develops a winner's curse model in which informed investors only invest in issues that they know are underpriced, thus leading to greater underpricing by underwriters. Beneviste and Spindt (1989) develop an information-gathering model, in which underpricing rewards informed investors for providing information on demand, price, and quantity to the underwriters. Welch (1989) provides a signaling model in which high quality firms tend to underprice. Lee et al. (1999) , using data on the Singapore stock exchange, show that large investors with better information request participation in IPOs with higher initial returns, thus being one of the first papers to document that larger investors have an informational advantage [8] . Other papers, such as Field (1997) , suggest that institutional investors may be better informed about IPO value than other investors. Carter and Manaster (1990) discuss how IPOs with higher returns have more informed investor capital. The analysis in this paper finds that the online process did not exhibit significantly lower underpricing than the traditional process, as had been initially intended by its founders. In Section V, the paper discusses how one reason for the auction underpricing may be that there is greater participation of smaller investors, who are less informed, and so are less able to accurately price an IPO.
Efficiency of IPO processes
Another strand of the literature examines how IPO firms perform following their debut, such as Jain and Kini (1994) , Ritter (1991) , and Teoh et al. (1998) . Krignam et al. (1999) examine underwriters pricing errors and show that first-day "winners" continue to be "winners" and that first-day "dogs" continue to be "dogs." Section IV of this analysis examines whether the mispricing of online auction IPOs continues to exceed the mispricing of traditional IPOs over time (one week, two weeks, four weeks, 60 days, 90 days, 180 days, one year after debuting) and finds that a greater degree of mispricing relative to traditional IPOs persists for 50-80 percent of online auction IPOs.
II. Data and summary statistics
This section describes some of the differences between the online auction process and the traditional IPO issuance process, both in terms of their comparative performance over the years, and in terms of their characteristics, such as the size and the industry sector of the firms using each of the processes to issue an IPO. The data, which are from SDC Platinum, consist of all IPOs issued by both the traditional underwriters and the online underwriter in the USA between February 1999 and June 2005. Table I subdivides the IPOs into those issued by the online auction process and those issued by traditional underwriters. Traditional underwriters are then subdivided into low volume underwriters, medium volume underwriters, and high volume underwriters. This paper defines low volume underwriters to be underwriting investment banks which served as primary lead bookrunner on under 14 IPOs between 1999 and 2005, medium volume underwriters to be underwriting investment banks which served as primary lead bookrunner for between 14 IPOs and 40 IPOs, and high volume underwriters to be underwriting investment banks which served as primary lead bookrunner for over 40 IPOs. Table I shows summary statistics, by underwriter category, on the total number of underwriters in that category, the number of IPOs, the percentage of total IPOs underwritten by each category of underwriter, and the average principal amount, size, and first day price surge of an IPO underwritten by an underwriter in each category.
Several interesting observations can be drawn from Table I . First, despite the publicity surrounding the process, the number of IPOs issued by the online auction process is small relative to the number issued by the traditional process. Within the traditional process, there are comparatively few high and medium volume underwriters, but they issue collectively over 80 percent of the IPOs. Second, based on these averages, the first day price increase of an IPO issued through the auction process is 29-30 percent, which is lower than the average for all of the traditional underwriters at 38 percent. This is consistent with the intention of the auction process to minimize mispricing. Nevertheless, when one segments the traditional underwriters into low, medium, and high volume underwriters, the auction process is more efficient than high volume underwriters (48 percent), as efficient as a medium volume underwriter (29 percent), and less efficient than low volume underwriters (10 percent). One would think that low volume underwriters, since they have less experience, should be less efficient at pricing IPOs than high volume underwriters. Nevertheless, the high volume underwriters were the investment banks who paid fines for allegedly intentionally underpricing IPOs to benefit their preferred clients, who received the initial allocations. Third, despite the fact that the degree of first day mispricing is much greater for the auction process than for low volume underwriters, auction IPOs tended IJMF 5, 3 Number of underwriters Table II compares the online auction IPOs and the IPOs issued through the traditional process based on industry sector as measured by the two-digit SIC code. Almost two third of traditional IPOs were in the same industry area as the IPOs issued by the auction process. Both processes had over 20 percent of their IPOs in the software/online services area, due to the growth of the internet at the time, and both had 7-8 percent of their IPOs in the area of manufacturing telecomm equipment and energy components. The auction process, however, had a greater emphasis than the traditional process in the soft drink/coffee industry area, the biotech and pharmaceutical area, the restaurant area, the online retail and catalog area, and the online financial services and loan services area. Table III shows the industry breakdown for traditional IPOs across all industry sectors (not just the ones overlapping with auction IPOs). Two of the top four industry areas for auction IPOs were also in the top four sectors for traditional IPOs (SIC 7300 and 2800). Six of the top ten industry sectors for traditional IPO issuance were the same industry areas as for auction IPOs. Nevertheless, when one compares IPOs issued in the same industry sector between the traditional process and the auction process (Table II) , the size of the issue in terms of number of shares is much smaller. The average number of shares of an auction IPO ranges from 5 percent of the average number of shares of a traditional IPO (SIC 2800) to over 50 percent (SIC 6700). Similarly, the average principal amount raised in an auction IPO ranged from 12 percent of the amount raised by the traditional IPO (SIC 5800) to 66 percent of the amount raised in a traditional IPO (SIC 6200). In many industry areas, the principal amount raised in auction IPOs was 30-50 percent of the amount raised in traditional IPOs (SIC 2800, 3600, 5900, 6100, and 6700). The only sector in which the share size and the average principal amount raised was greater for auction IPOs than traditional IPOs was in SIC 7300 when Google is included. If Google is excluded (see note in Table II) , then the average number of shares for auction IPOs in SIC 7300 is about 58 percent of the average number of shares of a traditional IPO in SIC 7300 and the average principal amount for auction IPOs is 66 percent of the amount raised by traditional IPOs. In short, while there was some overlap in industry area between online auction IPOs and traditional IPOs, auction IPOs tended to be smaller in terms of the principal amount raised and the number of shares in the issue. Table IV compares the percentage of technology IPOs issued in each year through the online auction process and through the traditional IPO process. The definition of a technology IPO follows Loughran and Ritter (2004) , and includes IPOs in SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 . In four of the seven years, the online auction process had no tech IPOs and, consequently, had a smaller percentage of IPOs debuting in this more broadly defined technology sector than in the traditional process. In three of the seven years, the online auction process had a higher percentage of technology IPOs than the traditional process. One explanation for the greater degree of mispricing in the online auction IPO process relative to the traditional process (seen in the averages in Table I process and that technology IPOs were more underpriced because they were in developing industries whose potential was harder to estimate at the time. Nevertheless, the data do not support this hypothesis because there was often a smaller percentage of technology IPOs debuting using the auction process than in the traditional process. 
Efficiency of IPO processes
The firms which went public using the online auction process had characteristics similar to firms that went public using the traditional process. The author obtained data on the age of the issuing firm, sales and net income of the firm in the 12 months prior to its IPO, and on the age and salary of its CEO by examining the S-3 that each firm, which debuted using the online auction process, had filed with the SEC. IPOs debuting using the online auction process were about nine years old, on average. If one excludes Morningstar and Peet's Coffee, which were over 20 years old when they went public, the average age was 6.3 years. Table V compares the age of a firm using the traditional process with the age of a firm using the online process on a year-by-year basis. In four of the seven years, firms using the online auction process were actually slightly older than firms using the traditional process. Examination of the S-3s also indicated that the base salary of the CEOs averaged $185,294 and the age of the CEO averaged around 51 years. The Ernst & Young IPO Study found that the average age for CEOs of firms who immediately qualified for listing in the Russell 2000 Index following their IPO using the traditional process was between 50 and 54 years and that the median age of the firm itself was eight to nine years old. This is similar to the pattern seen in this analysis for firms using the online auction process. Notes: Data for the median age of online issuers comes from the aggregation of information on the age of each online issuer obtained by the author through examining each company's S-3 filing with the SEC; composite median age data on traditional issuers are from the Field-Ritter dataset on founding dates for firms going public in the US during 1975-2006 Notes: The yearly percentages of technology IPOs issued through traditional underwriters and the online auction process were derived by the author from underlying raw data on SIC codes from SDC Platinum, the definition of technology IPOs includes IPOs in SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and Table VI compares the distribution of sales for a firm debuting using the traditional IPO process in the year preceding its IPO during the 1980s, the 1990s, the height of the dot-com bubble, and the 2000s, with the distribution of sales for firms debuting using the online auction process. The table suggests that the online auction process had a greater percentage of smaller firms with annual sales of under $10 million than the traditional IPO process at any period, with the exception of the 1999-2000 period (the peak of the dot-com era). The online process had similar percentages to the traditional IPO process in terms of the percentage of firms with sales between $10 and $20 million, between $20 and $50 million, and between $50 and $100 million. The online auction process had a smaller percentage of firms with sales greater than $100 million and greater than $200 million than the traditional process in every period, except during the peak of the dot-com period, when the percentages were similar. The conclusion that the online auction process tended to have a greater fraction of smaller firms than the traditional process, the same fraction of intermediate-size firms, and a smaller fraction of really large firms is consistent with the pattern in the data on the number of shares issued for online auction IPOs relative to the number of shares of IPOs issued by the traditional process (Tables I and II) . Table VII compares the average first day price surge for online auction IPOs with those of low, medium, and high volume traditional underwriters across the entire five-year period, and on a yearly basis. The first row reflects the findings previously discussed for Table I : although the average first day price increase for online issuers is higher than the average for traditional issuers, when traditional issuers are decomposed by volume of IPOs issued, the online process is less efficient than low volume underwriters, as efficient as medium volume underwriters, and more efficient than high volume underwriters. Second, the table compares the first day price surge by type of underwriter on a yearly basis -the degree of mispricing (as measured by absolute value) for online underwriters exceeded that of low volume, medium volume, 1980-1989 (traditional, %) Notes: The chart compares the sales in the 12 months preceding an IPO for firms using the traditional IPO process and firms using the online auction IPO process; data for the sales of firms using the online auction process comes from the aggregation of information on the sales of each online issuer obtained by the author through examining each company's S-3 filing with the SEC Source: Data on the sales for firms using the traditional IPO process comes from Ritter (2008) and high volume underwriters 42.8 percent of the time (in three of the seven years). Consequently, this suggests that the online process may not be as efficient in pricing as was originally intended. Moreover, an analysis of the average first day price surge per underwriter over the five-year period across all underwriters indicates that the average first day price surge for IPOs issued by WR Hambrecht's OpenIPO.com online auction mechanism met or exceeded the first day price surge for 82.4 percent of the primary lead bookrunners (108 out of 131) in the sample. The results in Table VII also suggest that while the first day surges in an IPOs price are important, the problem that the online auction mechanism was partially developed to solve has lessened. The average first day price increase has dropped substantially from the 55.4-92.5 percent range during 1999-2001 into the 6.3-8.6 percent range of [2002] [2003] [2004] . This gradual reduction in the magnitude of first day price surges over time may be a reflection of more careful pricing by some underwriters in the wake of substantial litigation concerning their alleged manipulation of IPOs, as discussed in the introduction [9] . Many of the investment banks with the top analysts and which engaged in "spinning" and "laddering" included some of the high volume traditional issuers in my analysis, which explains why their underpricing was so substantial -in many cases, the executives of the issuing firms were willing to accept underpricing in return for shares in other "hot" IPOs or in return for favorable coverage from the top analysts in the industry.
A second explanation for the high degree of underpricing during the dot-com era and the subsequent reduction in underpricing following the collapse of the bubble may be that many of the technology IPOs during the dot-com boom were in emerging industries, and, since most investors had a superficial understanding of the fundamentals and technology in these industries, they had difficulty in accurately pricing the issues and were influenced by "herd behavior." Indeed, at the peak of the dot-com bubble in 1999, over half of the IPOs issued through the online process and the traditional process were technology IPOs, using Loughran and Ritter's (2004) criteria, as was evident in Table IV. In short, the summary statistics in this section yield several key findings. First, the degree of underpricing has fallen over time, possibly due to the role of litigation in eliminating anticompetitive practices, such as "spinning," as detailed in Loughran and Ritter (2004) , and possibly due to the declining fraction of technology IPOs. Second, IPOs issued through the online auction process had a greater degree of average underpricing than low volume issuers and a lesser degree of average underpricing than high volume issuers. This suggests that the online auction process may not have been successful in its objective to minimize underpricing, although it did have lower average underpricing than traditional issuers when the three types are aggregated.
Are there differences in the types of firms choosing the online auction process relative to the traditional process for their IPO? Almost two third of traditional IPOs were in the same industry area as the IPOs issued by the online auction process, although the auction process had a greater emphasis in the soft drink/coffee industry area, the biotech and pharmaceutical area, the restaurant area, the online retail and catalog area, and the online financial services and loan services area. In four of the seven years, the online auction process had no tech IPOs and, consequently, had a smaller percentage of IPOs debuting in this more broadly defined technology sector than in the traditional process, while in three of the seven years, the online auction Efficiency of IPO processes process had a higher percentage of technology IPOs. Second, the IPOs debuting using the online auction process was smaller than IPOs debuting using the traditional process. This was true even if one matched the industry areas and compared the number of shares in an auction IPO and in a traditional IPO, as in Table II . The average number of shares of an auction IPO ranged from 5 percent of the average number of shares of a traditional IPO to over 50 percent. Similarly, the average principal amount raised in an auction IPO ranged from 12 percent of the amount raised by the traditional IPO to 66 percent. Not surprisingly, when the author examined sales in the 12 months preceding an IPO, the online auction process tended to have a greater fraction of smaller firms (as measured by sales) than the traditional process, the same fraction of intermediate-size firms, and a smaller fraction of larger firms. Age of the debuting firm did not differ substantially between firms choosing the auction process and firms choosing the traditional process: in four of the seven years, the auction IPOs were slightly older, and in three of the seven years, they were somewhat younger than IPOs using the traditional process.
III. Empirical results and sensitivity analysis
This section analyses whether the first day price surge exhibited by online auction IPOs is significantly higher than the first day price surge exhibited by traditional IPOs, controlling for various factors, such as the year, and several factors capturing the characteristics and risk of these IPOs. These factors include the industry of the issuing firm (as measured by the two-digit SIC code), as well as the size of the firm (as measured by the number of shares in its IPO). Other measures describing the characteristics of the firms going public were highly correlated with the industry and the size of the issue and so were not helpful in describing the differences in underpricing. For example, smaller firms as measured by sales or net income were likely to have smaller IPOs (as measured by the number of shares) than larger firms, so the number of shares variable picked up most of these differences, as was suggested by the summary data in Section II. Also, the number of shares was important to include because IPOs with a smaller number of shares could have greater underpricing if there were alot of pent-up demand relative to the supply of shares offered, which then would manifest itself when the IPO began to trade. The industry variables were important in describing risk because many of the traditional and online IPOs during this period were technology IPOs, and were often smaller, younger companies. Age of the company was not helpful in the regression specifications during this period both because, as described in Section II, there were not significant differences in age between the online IPOs and the traditional IPOs, and also because the industry codes often picked up the same type of information as age variables. The lack of significance of age was also seen in Loughran and Ritter (2004) during the 1999-2000 period and the 2001-2003 period[10] . Consequently, the regression results reported in the tables focus on the specifications using industry fixed effects by two-digit SIC code and IPO size in terms of number of shares to capture the firm-specific characteristics, since other iterations using similar metrics (age, etc.) yielded similar results.
As noted in the earlier tables, significantly more traditional IPOs were issued than auction IPOs. Consequently, Efficiency of IPO processes more than one traditional IPO issued in the same three-digit SIC code and in the same year, so their performance was compared to the average of the traditional IPOs issued in the same three-digit SIC code in the same year. The fifth column shows the difference in the percentage mispricing between the auction IPO and the traditional IPO -in four tenth of the IPOs (40 percent), the auction IPOs degree of mispricing was more than 7 percent greater than the percentage price surge of the comparable traditional IPO. The last column in Table VIII shows the percentage of traditional IPOs issued in the same three-digit SIC code and in the same year which had greater mispricing than the auction IPO. For 60 percent (six out of ten) of the auction IPOs, over 40 percent of the traditional IPOs issued in that year and in that three-digit SIC area had greater mispricing. This suggests that the online auction mechanism is not as efficient in minimizing the first day price surge as some have thought. Table IX shows the results of the regression estimating the first day price surge for an IPO as a function of SIC code dummies (for industry effects), year dummies (for year effects), a dummy variable for whether the IPO was issued through the online auction process, and variable for the number of shares issued in each IPO (to control for the size of the issue and of the firm) during the 1999-2005 period. The results indicate that online auction IPOs do not have statistically significantly higher or lower first day price surges than traditional IPOs, when controlling for year/industry effects, and the size of the issue. The industry effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 3.78, p ¼ 0.0000), the year effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 4.72, p ¼ 0.0001), and the coefficient for the number of shares outstanding was significant.
The models in Tables X-XII include dummy variables for the various types of traditional underwriters -low volume traditional underwriters, medium volume traditional underwriters, and high volume traditional underwriters -with one of them left out to serve as the base case. The model in Table X includes dummy variables for medium volume underwriters and high volume underwriters, in addition to dummy variables for year effects, industry effects, and whether the IPO debuted using the online auction process. The results indicate that online auction IPOs do not have a statistically significantly higher or lower first day price surges than traditional IPOs, when controlling for year and industry effects, relative to the base case. The results also suggested that high volume underwriters had statistically significantly higher first day price surges than low volume underwriters (the base case). Although the first day price surges are not statistically significantly different between online auction IPOs and low volume underwriters (the base case) or between medium volume underwriters and the base case, the sign on the online auction IPO coefficient is positive and the sign for the coefficient for medium volume underwriters is also positive. The industry effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 4.40, p ¼ 0.0000), the year effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.43, p ¼ 0.0296), and the medium and high volume effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.88, p ¼ 0.0563).
The model in Table XI differs from the model in Table X in that the dummy variables for low volume underwriters and high volume underwriters are included such that the base case is medium volume traditional underwriters, rather than high volume traditional underwriters (Table IV) Table XI in that the dummy variables for low volume and medium volume underwriters are included such that the base case is high volume traditional underwriters, rather than medium volume traditional underwriters. Again, the results indicate that online auction IPOs do not have a statistically different first day price surge in magnitude than high volume underwriters (the base case), when controlling for year/industry effects, and the type of traditional underwriter, although the sign on the online auction IPO (relative to the base case) is negative. The industry effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 4.40, p ¼ 0.0000), the year effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.35, p ¼ 0.0290), and the medium and high volume effects were jointly significant (F ¼ 2.97, p ¼ 0.0514). The results also suggested that low volume underwriters have a significantly lower first day price surge relative to the high volume underwriter base case. Medium volume underwriters did not have a significantly different first day price surge (although the sign on the coefficient was negative). Tables IX-XII are the most appropriate, as will be discussed, for measuring whether online auction IPOs have a significantly lower first day price surge than traditional underwriters, the models listed in the table also show that, regardless of the specification, the online auction IPOs do not have a statistically significantly lower price surge than traditional IPOs, as had been originally intended. Tables XIII, XV Tables XIII and XIV show the statistical results and the tests for the model specifications for Models I-III. All three models indicate that the online auction dummy is statistically insignificant. Model I only includes year effects, which are jointly significant. Model II includes year and industry effects, both of which are jointly significant. Model III includes year effects, industry effects, and a variable controlling for the size of the issue. The year effects and industry effects are jointly significant, and the variable controlling for the size of the issue is statistically significant. Inclusion of the variable controlling for the size of the issue increased the adjusted R 2 of the model to 0.392, which is consequently an improvement on Model I (0.009) and Model II (0.114). Model III is the basic model in Table IX and is the most effective of the basic models in estimating whether online auction IPOs have a lower first day surge than traditional IPOs, without including variables on whether the traditional underwriters are low volume, medium volume, or high volume underwriters.
Tables XV and XVI show the statistical results and the tests for model specifications for Models IV-VI. Again, all three models indicate that the online auction dummy is statistically insignificant. Models IV-VI have year effects, but not industry effects or a variable for the size of the issue, and include dummy variables for whether the traditional underwriters are low volume, medium volume, or high volume. 
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Models IV-VI differ based on which one is the base case. The year effects and the traditional volume IPO underwriter dummies are jointly significant in all of the models. Tables XVII and XVIII show the statistical results and the tests for model specifications for Models VII-IX. Again, all three models indicate that the online auction dummy is statistically insignificant. Models VII-IX differ from Models IV-VI in that they have added industry effects, which are jointly significant. Again, the year effects and the traditional underwriter indicator variables are jointly significant. Owing to inclusion of year effects, these models are an improvement on Models IV-VI and their results are described in more detail in Tables X-XII, which were discussed earlier in this section.
Tables XIX and XX show the statistical results and the tests for model specifications for Models X-XII. As in the other models, the online auction dummy is statistically insignificant. These models differ from Models VII-IX in that they include a variable for the size of the IPO, in addition to year effects, industry effects, and dummy variables for the type of underwriter. With the inclusion of a variable controlling for the number of shares in each issue, the volume dummies for traditional underwriters become jointly insignificant, although their inclusion was jointly significant in the models which did not include a variable controlling for the number of shares in each issue. This is not surprising since high volume underwriters have, on average, a greater number of shares in the IPOs that they issue (the average number of shares in an IPO is 14,600,000) than medium volume underwriters (7,806,649 shares) and low volume underwriters (5, 841, 266 Notes: Model IV, (first day price surge) Notes: Model IV, (first day price surge) Notes: Model VII, (first day price surge)
medium volume underwriter dummy)
I ; Model VIII, (first day price surge) Notes: Model X, (first day price surge)
number of shares offered in each IPO)
I ; Model XII, (first day price surge) Notes: Model X, (first day price surge) IJMF 5, 3 of underwriter are picking up some of the same effects that were incorporated into the variable for the number of shares of the issue. Also, as seen in other studies, such as Loughran and Ritter (2004) , smaller firms are less likely to go public using a "high prestige" underwriter [12] . These "high prestige" underwriters, as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004) , Manaster (1990), and Carter et al. (1998) , are largely the same as the high volume underwriters in this analysis -large, well-known investment banks which underwrite a number of IPOs.
Since separation of traditional underwriters into low, medium, and high volume underwriters is important to the analysis, the models in Tables XVII and XVIII are more appropriate than the models in Tables XIX and XX for comparing the size of the first day price surge. These models were described in more detail in Tables X-XII. For models in which all of the traditional underwriters are combined together, the most appropriate model is one which includes a variable controlling for the size of the issue and of the firm, but which excludes dummy variables for the type of traditional underwriter. This was the model in Table IX .
In summary, these models suggest that regardless of the specification of the model, IPOs which are issued through the online auction mechanism do not have first price surges which are statistically significantly different from the traditional IPOs. The sign on the online auction IPO is positive in nine of the 12 models; the only models in which the sign is negative are in three of the models with among the poorer fits (Models I, IV, and VII). This suggests that the first day price increase tends to be statistically insignificantly higher for IPOs issued through the online auction process, controlling for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, size of the IPO, and whether the traditional underwriter is a high volume underwriter, a low volume underwriter, or a medium volume underwriter.
The models also provide information on the size of the first day price surge between the various types of traditional underwriters. Models IV-VI, which have only year effects, but not industry effects, suggest that low volume underwriters have a statistically significantly lower price surge than high volume underwriters, and that medium volume underwriters have a lower price surge than high volume underwriters and a higher price surge than low volume underwriters, although the results are not statistically significant. These findings are consistent with the average first day price surges for low volume, medium volume, and high volume underwriters in Tables I and  VII . Models VII-IX differ from Models IV-VI in that they add industry fixed effects, which are jointly significant; the conclusions and results, however, are identical. Models X-XII differ from Models VII-IX in that they add a variable controlling for the size of the issue. Since inclusion of this variable makes the volume dummies for traditional IPO underwriters unnecessary (as can be seen in their statistical insignificance) because high volume underwriters, on average, issue larger IPOs, these models are not as useful as the previous sets in evaluating the relative behavior of the three types of traditional underwriters. Nevertheless, although the results are statistically insignificant, the sign of the low volume coefficients tend to support the hypothesis that low volume underwriters have lower first day price increases than medium or high volume underwriters.
Although the online auction IPOs exhibit some degree of mispricing, does it persist over time to a greater degree than the mispricing exhibited by IPOs issued through the traditional process? Table XXI examines the degree of mispricing for IPOs over several Efficiency of IPO processes time periods: after the first day of trading, after one week of trading, after two weeks of trading, after four weeks of trading, after 60 days of trading, after 90 days of trading, after 180 days of trading, and after one year of trading. The second column shows the percentage of online auction IPOs whose absolute percentage price increase from the original offer price exceeds that of the comparable traditional IPO, issued in the same year and in the same three-digit industry SIC code. The table indicates that, for most time periods, generally over 60 percent of online IPOs still have a greater degree of mispricing relative to their original offer price, when compared to the degree of mispricing exhibited by their traditional counterpart. This suggests that the offer price set in auctions is less reflective of the true value of the company than the offer price set through the traditional process. In summary, the analysis suggests that the auction process tends to be more efficient, on average, than the traditional processes of many medium to high volume underwriters, and less efficient on average than the traditional processes of many low volume underwriters. Although one would have expected medium and high volume underwriters to be more efficient at pricing IPOs because they have had the opportunity to price so many of them, they are also more likely than low volume underwriters to have a large client base and to possibly reward their clients who assist them in the initial book-building process by mispricing the IPO so that these clients can benefit from the price increase on the first day of trading. When analysing the average first day price surges by underwriter across all underwriters, the average first day price surge for OpenIPO.com exceeds the average first day price increase for 82.4 percent of the underwriters. When examining together all IPOs in all SIC codes issued by all underwriters, use of the online auction issuance process had a consistently statistically insignificant impact on the first day price increase. This was Notes: This table compares the frequency for which the absolute value of the percentage change in the stock price for IPOs issued through the online auction mechanism exceeds the absolute value of the percentage change of the average of IPOs issued through the traditional process in the same three-digit SIC industry area in the same year, the analysis compares these numbers at various time intervals following issuance of the online auction IPO and the traditional IPOs; the absolute value of the percentage change measures the degree to which mispricing (relative to the offer price) occurs; the findings in this table are consistent with the hypothesis that the online auction IPO process does not reduce mispricing relative to the traditional process Source: SDC Platinum also confirmed by t-tests of the differences between the mean degree of underpricing for online auction IPOs and low, medium, and high volume underwriters.
IV. Possible causes and solutions to potential problems in the online auction process The online process is not as successful as had been hoped in minimizing the first-day price surges of IPOs. Although, by its structure, it eliminates potentially intentional mispricing by underwriters to benefit the larger financial institutions who assist them in building a "book" of orders, the online auction process still leads to mispricing. Possible causes of this mispricing include:
. a lack of information on the part of the small investors relative to larger financial institutions;
.
an adverse selection problem concerning the types of firms which choose to issue online; and The mispricing in online auctions may be due to the involvement of small investors, who do not have access to detailed sources of information on the company. The investment banks and institutional investors who price the IPO in the traditional process analyse companies routinely, and also have a greater capability than small investors to meet with and interview representatives of the issuing firm. Firms that do their IPO through the online auction process do not have to provide as much information concerning their uses of funds as they would in the traditional process. This is because the investment banks, under the online auction process, do not engage in the "book-building" process. Examples of types of information that issuing firms could provide which would be useful to investors include:
. the uses for the capital that they are raising;
. their strategies for overcoming potential challenges;
. the corporate governance mechanisms within the firm (share of outsiders on the board, etc.);
. their reasons for using the online auction process, rather than the traditional process; and . their involvement in any current or potential litigation.
As investors become more familiar with the auction process, they may be less likely to bid conservatively in the presence of greater information.
The degree of mispricing for Google was more substantial than the performance of comparable IPOs in its industry group which debuted in the same year using the traditional method. Google's offer price was $85 and it closed at $100.34, reflecting an 18 percent increase, while the average first day price increase for all IPOs issued in 2004 was 8.6 percent. Indeed, analysis of the data shows that 82 percent of the IPO's issued in 2004 experienced less of a jump from the offer price to the closing price on the Efficiency of IPO processes first day of trading than Google did. Google's first day price increase also exceeded that of IPOs in its peer group: about 70 percent of the IPOs in its three-digit SIC code issued in 2004 experienced less of a first day price increase and about 60 percent of the IPOs in Google's four-digit SIC code, focusing largely on the internet search arena, exhibited less of a first day price increase. One of the criticisms of Google was that it was "secretive" in how it would use its funds and conveyed little detailed information (the Wall Street Journal, 2004a). At the time, Google faced several strategic issues, which in the absence of more detailed information on the uses of the capital to be raised, may have been difficult for the smaller investors to evaluate. These included Google's lack of diversification in revenue sources and reliance on online advertising, rather than on the other subscription-based services (unlike Yahoo and Microsoft). Despite the lack of external transparency in Google's strategic processes, it has continued to surpass analysts' earnings expectations. Nevertheless, the online process could be used more by companies, which may not have a clear sense of the uses for the funds that they are raising or their uses of funds may not be appropriately assessed by smaller investors if enough information is not provided to them.
In the case of Google's auction, many informed investors -institutional investors and hedge funds -entered in the market after the stock had debuted, contributing to its upward price momentum (The Washington Post, 2004a, b) ; their earlier entry might have provided greater price support in developing the offer price. Nevertheless, the larger investment banks felt "locked out of the process," and lacked financial incentives to push Google's IPO to their clients. This may also have been the case for other online auction IPOs.
The recent SEC proposals to liberalize the "quiet period" may provide a solution to the possible informational problems inherent in the online auction process. During the "quiet period," companies traditionally have been only allowed to give out information orally (in presentations), but not in written form (except for the company's prospectus). Consequently, the "quiet period" increased the informational disadvantage of small investors relative to larger institutional investors, since smaller investors are less likely to be able to attend company presentations and more likely to be reliant on written documents available to the public. In late October 2004, the SEC voted to liberalize these rules by allowing companies planning an IPO to communicate information to investors verbally or in writing, provided that this information would be filed with the SEC (the Wall Street Journal, 2004b). Indeed, the SEC has also proposed to allow the marketing "roadshows" of IPOs to be broadcast online to all investors, although this is not a requirement such that companies which only want to present materials before the traditional audience can do so (the Wall Street Journal, 2005b). Smaller and less well-known companies, previously handicapped by their inability to use the media and the web during the "quiet period" to generate interest, are more likely to stimulate investor enthusiasm in their IPO (the Investment Dealers Digest, 2004) . This relaxation of the "quiet period" restrictions will make it easier for companies using the online auction process to provide small investors with information if the company wants to do so. With the relaxation of the "quiet period" restrictions, companies can minimize the informational problems inherent in auctions.
A second potential flaw of the online process lies in the possibility of an adverse selection problem inherent in the types of firms choosing to use the online process, IJMF 5, 3 which could lead to a lemons "discount" being placed on these issues by uninformed investors [13] . Since firms using the online process are not subjected to the rigorous interviews of the investment banks in the traditional "book-building" process, firms which are well-known, but which would have had difficulty in going public for some reason using the traditional IPO process may be more likely to use the online auction mechanism. For example, when Morningstar, which rates mutual funds, decided to go public using the online auction process in January 2005, it did so at a time when it was under legal investigation and when its IPO filing under the traditional process had consequently been dormant since This explanation is similar to the "changing risk composition" hypothesis, discussed in Ritter (1984) in which underpricing increases in an IPO market as the proportion of IPOs that are perceived as "risky" increases. Nevertheless, the sources of "risk" would lie more in the lack of information provided by the issuing firm than in other characteristics. As we showed previously in our comparison of characteristics of issuing firms using the online auction IPO process and the traditional IPO process, the firms using the online auction IPO process have many similarities to firms using the traditional IPO process in terms of company age, and industry. The main difference is that, on average, they tend to issue a smaller number of shares, and that a higher percentage of online auction IPOs are likely to have sales below $10 million than traditional IPOs.
Inherent conservatism of investors may be a third explanation for the underpricing. One of the lessons that investors learned in the dot-com boom is that a knowledge of the underlying company is important in valuing it. Consequently, at least initially, investors may be setting low offer prices for IPOs because of this lesson and because of the relative youth of the auction process. Indeed, OpenIPO served as lead manager for only four IPOs prior to 2001, by which time the market was declining and investors were more wary in their bids. The inherent conservatism of investors in auctions may have been a factor in the Google auction: the fund manager of the Legg Mason Value Trust noted in his letter to shareholders that:
[. . .] many investors may have steered clear of the Google auction because "the determination of what to bid would require considerable work [. . .]" we were delighted when the so-called FUD [fear, uncertainty, doubt] dominated the process, resulting in the shares coming in at the bargain price of $85 (Ian, 2005) .
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V. Conclusion
The online auction process was developed in response to the substantial increases between IPOs offer prices and their open prices at the peak of the dot-com era. Table VII suggests that while the first day surges in an IPOs price are important, the problem that the online auction mechanism was partially developed to solve has lessened. The average first day price increase has dropped substantially from the 55.4-92.5 percent range during 1999-2001 into the 6. 3-8.6 percent range of 2002-2004 . This gradual reduction in the magnitude of first day price surges over time may be a reflection of more careful pricing by some underwriters in the wake of substantial litigation concerning their alleged manipulation of IPOs, as well as that many of the IPOs during the dot-com era were in emerging industries and therefore were difficult to price. The findings of this analysis suggest that the online auction process does not minimize the first day price surge of an IPO to the degree that was initially intended when the process was developed. The types of firms choosing the auction IPO process relative to the traditional IPO process tended to be smaller firms, as measured by sales and number of shares in their IPO issue. Even controlling for the two-digit SIC industry area, auction IPOs tended to be smaller than traditional IPOs. The percentage of technology firms and the age distribution of the firms were similar between the online and traditional process, although they varied from year to year -in four of the seven years, the auction process hosted slightly older firms or had fewer technology IPOs than the traditional process, while in three of the seven years, the opposite effects were seen. Industry sector and number of shares in the IPO reflected many of the characteristics of online and traditional firms, which also could be seen in age, sales, etc.
Regression analyses controlling for year and industry effects, as well as the size of the IPO, suggest that the first day price surge of the online auction IPO process did not statistically significantly differ from the first day price surge of the traditional process, even when controlling for type of traditional underwriter (low volume, medium volume, and high volume). A comparison of auction IPOs with traditional IPOs issued in the same year and in the same three-digit SIC code suggests that for 60 percent (six out of ten) of the auction IPOs, over 40 percent of the traditional IPOs issued in that year and in that three-digit SIC area had greater mispricing. High volume traditional underwriters have a statistically significantly higher first day price surge than low volume traditional underwriters, which is surprising because high volume underwriters, due to the number of IPOs that they price, should be better able to price an issue than low volume underwriters. This finding provides evidence supporting the legal allegations against larger investment banks in 2002-2003 that they may have been manipulating IPO prices during the dot-com era in an effort to reward their preferred clients who assisted them in pricing the IPO. This analysis also finds that the mispricing of online IPOs relative to their traditional counterparts issued in the same three-digit SIC code and in the same year persists over time (one week, two weeks, four weeks, 60 days, 90 days, 180 days, and one year after debuting) for 50-80 percent of online auction IPOs.
Although the online auction process increases the ability of small investors to participate in the IPO process, the process may suffer from several problems. First, small investors may lack the ability to efficiently price an IPO due to informational asymmetries either because small investors lack access to the sources of information that institutional investors have, or because companies are not required to provide IJMF 5, 3 detailed information in the online process since they do not undergo the rigorous scrutiny of investment banks in the traditional bookbuilding process. Second, since the informational scrutiny is reduced, the online process could be used more by companies which may not have a clear sense of the uses for the funds that they are raising or by well-known companies which may not have been successful in the traditional issuance process. This could lead to an adverse selection problem, as investors could have difficulty in distinguishing successful companies from "lemons," and consequently could end up discounting the price of all online IPOs.
Nevertheless, with interest in IPOs rebounding and the growing belief of small investors that they can become involved early with new issues, it is likely that some of the weaknesses of the online process may be improved. Some of the solutions include:
. the SEC reforms on the "quiet period," which will minimize the informational asymmetry between small investors and larger institutional investors; and . greater provision of information by issuing companies concerning uses of capital to be raised, etc. so that small investors can better distinguish good companies from "lemons."
Developing new methods of IPO issuance, increasing available information, and involving more parties in the process are likely to lead to a more egalitarian and transparent process for providing new companies with capital.
bidders (who had initially bid above $11) pay $11 per share and receive 80 percent of the shares for which they had bid because 1 million shares divided by 1.25 million shares is 80 percent. Available at: www.wrhambrecht.com (accessed January 21, 2008). 8. Several papers discuss the phenomenon of IPO underpricing in various countries, including Loughran et al. (1994) and Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) . 9. Loughran and Ritter (2004, pp. 8-9 ) discuss some of the legal issues and settlements linked to the behavior of underwriting investment banks during the dot-com era. For example, they note that Robertston Stephens, in its settlement with the SEC and NASD in 2003, admitted to allocating IPOs to clients on the basis of past and future commission business, and that CSFB received commissions which were 65 percent of investor profits from IPOs, such as VA Linux. 10. Many of the studies which use other variables to capture the characteristics of the firms, such as Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Carter et al. (2000) , do not use industry variables based on two-digit SIC code or number of shares in the IPO because the effects captured by these variables are often reflected in the regressors used in their specifications. 11. Table V includes only ten out of the 14 IPOs which debuted using the online auction process, since the other four did not have comparable IPOs issued in the same year in the same three-digit SIC industry area. 12. More prestigious underwriters are listed before the other underwriters in the non-managing underwriting section of an IPOs prospectus in brackets, and underwriters which always appear in the highest bracket receive a "9" on the nine-point scale. These "high prestige" underwriters," are underwriters with a ranking of "8" or higher on a nine-point scale. 13. Despite the fact that an individual "uninformed" investor may have less purchasing power than a given "informed" investor, the aggregation across individual "uninformed" investors" of "lemons discounts" in the bidding process could lead to substantial underpricing.
